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equilibrium," is particularly observable.9 These models claim that stable institutional patterns structure political life. By creating vested interests which promote their own persistence, institutions gain considerable autonomy and strength to withstand shifts in the broader political and socioeconomic environment. Even a challenge which is drastic enough to upset established institutional patterns is conditioned in its impact by the institutional setting in which it occurs. Historical institutionalists therefore view political development as a path-dependent process: following one path channels further development down the same path and precludes other options.
According to this view, significant political change takes place only at "critical junctures" or "turning points," when institutional patterns are challenged by strong socioeconomic or political pressures. Such moments present rare opportunities for political actors to reshape the political landscape by founding new institutions. Periods of regime transition, when the rules of the game are in flux, constitute such moments. If change is to occur, quick action must be taken before the transition period comes to a close and patterns and practices inherited from the previous regime have a chance to congeal. After these windows of opportunity close, stability prevails, and profound political change, which would reshape the institutional framework, is unlikely. If left unchallenged during the regime change, previous institutional patterns are believed to be reaffirmed and given a strong foundation to persist. A historical institutionalist perspective would predict that, if the military and other conservative elites managed to retain strong institutional prerogatives throughout a transition from authoritarian rule, they would be able to preserve their power and set limits to popular sovereignty in the new democracy.
Electoral Competition Leads Civilians to Contest the Military
In contrast to the view described above, my research on postauthoritarian Brazil suggests that countries that return to civilian rule through elite-led negotiations need not be constrained indefinitely by the balance of forces that prevailed in the transition and immediate posttransition period. Civil-military relations in postauthoritarian Brazil have displayed much greater dynamism than a historical-institutionalist framework can account for. The firm hand the armed forces exercised over the transition and the institutional prerogatives they retained indeed strengthened their political clout in the immediate aftermath of the transition. The army's interference in civilian decision making was considerable and often met with success in this initial period.' Yet as the authoritarian past receded, the advantage that military elites could reap from factors stemming from the transition began to erode. Within roughly three years, elected officials began to take gradual yet significant steps to check the military's political interference. Politicians first confronted the military over issues that directly affected their popularity and electoral standing. Later, their actions included efforts to diminish the military's institutional basis for political involvement, for example, by forming civilian-led organs to replace the National Security Council and the National Information Service. At the same time, while some of the military's institutional prerogatives remained in existence, leading officers appeared increasingly unable to use them to wield actual political influence.
How do I explain this unanticipated result? I argue that electoral competition creates incentives for politicians to reduce the interference of a politically powerful and active military and that electoral victory enhances their capacity to do so. This claim rests on two premises: that politicians are first and foremost interested in their own political survival and that the broad institutional context in which they operate structures their behavior. These premises suggest that politicians will contest the military when military actions conflict with their opportunity to gain widespread electoral appeal. Thus, in contrast to the view that political arrangements that are founded or reaffirmed during regime transitions will remain entrenched even as the political landscape around them changes, I contend that broad political and institutional shifts-in this case, the unfolding of the rules and norms of democracy-can disrupt patterns and practices put in place under a different set of circumstances. Rather than creating a static framework, democracy unleashes a competitive dynamic conducive to change. This analysis is inspired by the literature on rational choice, which focuses on actors and their intentions and explains political action with reference to rational interest calculation. Strategic interaction among individuals maximizing their self-interest is seen as the foundation of politics. In the rational choice perspective, institutions result from this kind of interaction among individuals; they are created by actors pursuing their own preferences in instrumental ways. Once established, institutions set parameters for individual actors and their interest calculations, but they are always open to further modification."I Authors such as Barry Ames and Barbara Geddes advance arguments based on these explicit premises to explain politics and institutional change in Latin America.12 These ideas are also reflected in Douglas Chalmers' concept of the "politicized state," which differs fundamentally from Krasner's model of "punctuated equilibrium."'3 Whereas Krasner stresses the stickiness of institutions and confines the possibility of change to rare but major moments of reorientation, such as regime transitions, Chalmers emphasizes the ever-present fluidity of Latin American politics, marked by frequent incremental shifts in the balance of power among self-interested actors and the institutional arrangements they establish.
Both historical institutionalism and rational choice focus on the relationship between actors and institutions, but they differ in their views of the malleability of institutions and the direction of the causal relationship between actors and institutions. Historical institutionalism sees institutional arrangements as resistant to change, except during rare crises, and focuses on the constraints that institutions impose on actors. By contrast, rational choice sees institutions as more mutable and underscores the capacity of actors to shape institutions and modify them once created. Rational choice theorists recognize that actors are conditioned by their institutional setting but hasten to emphasize that this framework itself is the product of interaction among self-interested individuals.
Insofar as my empirical findings show that self-interested actors began rather quickly to reshape institutional arrangements and to alter the balance of political power in their favor, my study bears out the guiding principles of rational choice and diverges from those of historical institutionalism. The rules of democracy in Brazil have fostered political competition and thus induced and enabled politicians to challenge the terms of the conservative pact made during the transition from authoritarianism. In particular, politicians have begun to remove important constraints on popular sovereignty by contesting the institutional prerogatives of the military and by reducing its political influence.
What, more specifically, are the factors that induce and enable civilian politicians to undermine military tutelage over the new democracy? Why do many efforts by politicians to enhance their electoral chances conflict with positions the armed forces hold? And how do politicians gain the force to advance their preferences even against opposition from the armed forces?
Democratization gives rise to two types of incentives: programmatic and particularistic. Particularistic incentives concern the use of resources to fuel politicians' personal support networks. Programmatic incentives involve the credit given to politicians for advances in public policy (for example, health, education, welfare, and economic reform). Both types of incentives are operative in Brazil, as in most democracies. And in different ways, both generate strong and specific pressures against the persistence of the military's political involvement. In addition to unleashing "populist" tendencies, democratization in Brazil has reinforced particularistic incentives associated with political clientelism, often at the armed forces' expense. Electoral competition has motivated politicians to search ever more energetically for economic assets to distribute as political pork barrel, thereby improving their chances of reelection. The rampant pursuit of patronage resources by politicians not only clashes with the long-standing positivist impulse within the military to "rationalize" the public bureaucracy. It also leads them to enter into direct competition with military elites over state resources. Politic ans are tempted to shift budget shares away from the military to civilian ministries better suited for pork barrel. Similarly, where military officers hold key posts in large state enterprises--strategic positions from which to build a network of political allies by distributing jobs and other benefits -patronage-seeking politicians will try to replace them. The competition for resources is thus another way in which the incentives unleashed by democratic competition militate against the continued entrenchment of the military in the political and economic fabric of the country.
The goal of political autonomy constitutes a further reason for politicians to oppose a politically active military. The capacity of politicians to formulate and implement policies demanded by the electorate without incurring outside interference is a crucial basis of reelection. In Brazil, this capacity applies more to presidents than to legislators, who rely relatively less on taking public policy stands and more on providing particularistic services.14 Because they are ultimately held accountable, politicians seek maximum control over events and processes that occur within their jurisdiction, territorial or functional. 15 Large bureaucratic organizations like the military can compromise the latitude they need to carry out public policies in response to public opinion. Democratization has indeed created conflicts between politicians who seek this independence and politically inclined army leaders who pose a threat to this objective.
The conflict between civilian and military interests that democracy causes creates strong pressures for elected politicians to reduce the military's sphere of influence. Although ideology does not become irrelevant, and all politicians will not follow this course of action all of the time, nevertheless, the survival interests of politicians are sufficiently compelling to promise a contraction of the military's domain over time.
If electoral competition unleashes incentives to diminish military influence, the popular support that electoral victory certifies enhances the capacity of politicians to do so. A military organization would incur great risk and cost in taking forceful measures against a government with solid popular backing. The greater the mandate a given government enjoys, the less likely military elites will aggressively counteract civilian attempts to diminish their political role. In Brazil, direct election-if only by 53 percent of the valid vote-helped President Fernando Collor face down the armed forces in the initial stages of his government.16 Collor's predecessor, President Jos6 Sarney, was far more beholden to the armed forces. The weakness of Sarney's mandate, beginning with the nonelectoral route by which he came to power, left him exposed to the armed forces.17 President Itamar Franco, who replaced Collor in the wake of his impeachment, suffers from the same weakness and thus has manifested greater timidity than his predecessor in taking steps to increase civilian preponderance.
Two conditions, the weakly institutionalized nature of Brazilian politics and the demobilization of the antisystem left in the post-Cold War era, strengthen the dynamic described above. While the first condition heightens the incentives for political elites to challenge the armed forces, the second removes a previous disincentive. Together, they render politicians more likely to contest military interference in politics.
The absence of deep party loyalties among voters, a central characteristic of Brazil's party system, renders the time horizons of politicians exceptionally short. Under formidable constraints to meet the immediate demands of voters (or be put out of office), politicians seek to reduce interference from any source that could obstruct their ability to achieve this goal, including the military. The highly clientelistic nature of politics is a further aspect of the weakness of Brazil's party system. Most political parties base their appeal more on patronage than on programs.'8 Clientelism is responsible for reinforcing politicians' interest in decreasing the military's claim over state funds and other resources.
If characteristics of Brazil's political system strengthen the incentives that lead politicians to contest the military, features particular to the current era and their effect on power relations in the broader society reinforce this tendency. Politicians need to respond to electoral incentives in a democracy, but they must also respond to power relations, which vary across time and national borders. Why is the military interested in restricting the right to strike? The goal of a quiescent labor movement has social, political, and economic dimensions. The socially disruptive effects of strikes-street protests, the destruction of property, the failure to deliver goods and services-are antithetical to the core military principles of order and discipline. To the extent that unions are often linked to leftist parties and social movements with a broad political agenda, they are seen as a potential political threat. Brazil's armed forces have also feared that an activist labor movement would demand a "premature" redistribution of the country's wealth and thereby impede its potential to become a major industrial power. The military's perception that the labor mobilization of the early 1960s constituted a grave social, political, and economic threat led the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime to reimpose the strict limits on strikes established in the corporatist legislation of the Estado Novo and to strengthen these limits in the National Security Law. 21 What Recognizing that the political opening would fuel labor mobilization, the military regime sought to prepare for it. In August 1978 President Geisel formulated a plan to relax authoritarian controls overall but to keep the prohibition of strikes in "essential" economic sectors. Decree Law (DL) 1632 was designed to achieve this goal. Given its status as a decree law, DL 1632 was virtually guaranteed passage. Congress had sixty days to approve or reject it. If Congress failed to vote within this period, it would be automatically approved. 24 The issuance of DL 1632 generated a wave of public criticism. It continued to ban strikes in wide-ranging sectors deemed "essential" but softened the penalties for conducting illegal strikes. Union leaders took issue with the number of areas categorized as "essential" and attacked the government for perpetuating the notion that strikes were a crime rather than a fundamental right. Pazzianotto wrote and revised the strike bill from mid 1985 to mid 1986. The military, business, and unions tried to influence the proposal. Leading generals insisted that the bill prohibit strikes in the public sector and in numerous services. They succeeded in pressuring Pazzianotto to make the draft bill more restrictive.28 Business leaders also opposed early drafts of the bill for being too sympathetic to workers. Their main concern was to achieve efficient solutions to labor disputes. Union leaders of all types argued that the bill represented little improvement over existing legislation and criticized Pazzianotto for heeding military and business demands. In fact, the final version was quite conservative. It prohibited strikes in a broad range of sectors-most of those deemed "essential" in Decree Law 1632. In sectors deemed "nonessential" it placed other obstacles in the way of legal strikes.29 Since constitutional deliberations were in progress before Pazzianotto's bill was put on the congressional agenda, however, its specifications had no real consequence. The next step in the evolution of labor policy was the constitution of 1988. Notwithstanding the disappointments of 1985-86, workers won tremendous gains in the new constitution. The open political forum of the constituent assembly redounded to their advantage. Among labor's greatest victories was the unrestricted right to strike. Even public servants and employees in sectors previously considered essential were not excluded from this right, at least until a complementary law was instituted to regulate it.30 The composition of the constituent assembly did not militate in favor of labor. Approximately fifty-two percent of assembly members belonged to the conservative block, the Centrao. Only about twenty-two percent of all assembly members could be counted on to represent working class interests.31 Against these odds, organized labor was able to convince politicians across the political spectrum to side with many of its demands. Three factors explain labor's success: the concentration of energy and resources by the electoral left on labor issues, the adept lobby that defended workers' interests, and the electoral motivations of politicians in supporting a prolabor stance. This discussion focuses on the third factor.
At the outset of the constitutional debates, the organization that headed the lobby on labor issues, DIAP (Interunion Department for Legislative Advice), advanced a proposal which included expanded strike rights, greater job security, a reduced work week, and a minimum wage increase. The military rejected virtually all of these points, except an increase in the minimum wage. Business groups were prepared to compromise on everything except guarantees of job security.
Leading officers took their case to the constituent assembly, whose members were identical with congress. As negotiations unfolded, it became evident that the military lobby lacked the resources necessary to gain adequate leverage over congressional votes.32 Evidently, it was unwilling to call upon the central power capability of the armed forces--intimidation--for this purpose. Notably, only where business elites forged an explicit alliance with the military-over the issue of expanding job security-was the labor lobby thoroughly defeated. Business groups, which had contributed funds to the electoral campaigns of many assembly members, appear to have had more sway than the armed forces.
In the end, the constitution met most of labor's basic demands although it did not extend job security or completely abolish the corporatist organizational structure of unions. To the extent that aspects of the corporatist structure remained, pressure from established union leaders, not the military, was responsible. The unrestricted right to strike was a central victory for labor. 3 The final vote for expanding strike rights was ample: 436 in favor versus thirty-eight against and nineteen abstentations.34 Conservative support was marshaled strategically. The labor lobby not only played on electoral interests. Its supporters, including politicians from the PT and PMDB, threatened to back more far-reaching proposals, such as job security provisions, if conservatives did not support the more moderate reform package that eventually passed.35 In the aftermath of the vote, the army minister publicly accused legislators of being more concerned with their own political advancement than with the country's future. Echoing this interpretation was one of the few dissenting legislative voices, Luis Roberto Ponte, who denounced his fellow assembly members for being too oriented to the vote of "November 15," the day of the upcoming municipal election.36
Labor victories in the constitution did not deter military leaders from persisting in their efforts to dampen labor protest. The next attempt they made was to regulate the unrestricted right to strike. The military ministers, in conjunction with civilian ministers concerned about the effect of wage increases on inflation and the public budget, pressured President Sarney in April 1989 to curb the strike wave afflicting Brazil. The counsel general, together with a leading army general, drafted a "provisional measure," or medida provis6ria, aimed at restricting strikes. Under Brazil's new democracy, the president can issue a medida provis6ria under "exceptional circumstances." Congress has thirty days to approve or reject it. In the event of its approval, the measure becomes law. In the event of congressional rejection or inaction, it becomes invalid. During the thirty days, the terms of the measure are binding. While leaving the president considerable power, this legal innovation of Brazil's new democracy represents a large decrease in executive powers relative to the decree law under military rule. Whereas congress needed to actively reject a decree law to invalidate it, it now needs to actively approve a medida provis6ria for it to remain in effect.
In late April 1989 the executive put forth a medida provis6ria (MP) which made it difficult to conduct a legal strike. The MP required the presence of a high percentage of union members (at least one-third) to even decide whether to strike, one-half of which had to vote affirmatively. Moreover, the MP enumerated a long list of essential services (thirteen in all) in which union leaders were required to communicate the intention to strike at least two days in advance. It also obligated unions in these sectors to assure the continued functioning of basic services for the duration of the strike. If they failed to do so, the president could summon members of the population for this purpose. Finally, the MP specified stiff penalties against those who violated the legal criteria for a strike." Military leaders applauded the MP and sought to persuade congress of its merit.
How did congress react to the MP? While explicitly prolabor parties attacked it as downright draconian and moderate politicians likened it to the restrictive legislation of the military regime, conservative legislators were reluctant to take a stand. On the one hand, they recognized the existence of constituencies that were frustrated with the paralysis resulting from strikes and felt that labor should be "kept in its place." On the other hand, they were aware of the possible risks of antagonizing prolabor groups.38 Few were receptive to the military lobbyists who knocked on their doors.
Congress rejected the MP by failing to vote on it within thirty days. Given the provisions of a medida provis6ria, conservative legislators could no longer assure the passage of unpopular legislation by simply avoiding the issue, as they had done with Decree Law 1632 in 1978. The president immediately reissued the MP. As long as its terms were binding, any congressional substitute for strike regulation, which would undoubtedly be less restrictive, was preferable for labor. The chair of the joint congressional committee that produced the replacement, or substitutivo, was Senator Ronan Tito, leader of the PMDB in the senate. Tito walked a tightrope. While needing to place some restrictions on strikes in order to prevent an endless repetition of issuance and defeat of the MP, he needed to produce a substitutivo liberal enough so as not to jeopardize his own standing with voters and his party's presidential candidate, Ulysses Guimaries.39
In his draft, Tito modified some aspects of the MP which provoked the most widespread opposition and omitted the high quorum required to decree a legal strike, the presidential prerogative of requisitioning civilians to guarantee essential services, and the stiff penalties for workers who participated in illegal strikes. The law that congress passed in June 1989 respected these omissions. While continuing to place some limits on the right of workers to strike, its terms are far less restrictive than the government's original proposal.40 The vote in the chamber of deputies was solidly in favor of the new law (244 for, eighty-two against, and four abstentions). In the senate, the vote was symbolic, with only two senators casting negative votes. 41 Legislators from labor-oriented parties (the PT and PDT) acknowledged the new law as a vast improvement over the government's previous proposal to regulate the right to strike but still opposed it for being too restrictive.42 Conservative politicians by and large supported the new law. Nevertheless, the military regarded it as excessively permissive. Members of the government also felt that the new law was not stringent enough to prevent strikes from occurring on a widespread scale. Notably, however, President Sarney did not attempt to veto the new strike law. He was realistic about the goals and powers of congress, which militate against military tutelage and control over the labor movement.
In summary, over enduring military opposition the labor movement made significant legal gains in the first postauthoritarian government and has managed to maintain them until the present. Electoral motivations affected a sufficient number of politicians to yield decisions that would not have been expected on the basis of ideological leanings and political affiliations. The growing electoral strength of the labor movement and of PT presidential candidate Luis Indicio da Silva (Lula) suggests that many Brazilian politicians will continue to take into account the concerns of labor and other popular sectors.
Budget Allocations: Politicians Reduce Military Resources Defense spending has been a highly contentious issue in Brazil's new democracy. Civil-military conflict over military budgets is common in countries which have recently undergone a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. What accounts for it? One explanation centers on the reluctance of politicians to reward an institution they feel was responsible for great misdeeds. This explanation is indeed founded in countries where the armed forces devastated the economy and committed extensive human rights violations, as in Argentina. 43 An interpretation that applies across more countries and for a more enduring time period concerns the competing demands for state funds that democracy creates. To win voters, politicians try to expand social and economic spending, consequently cutting into military expenditures. This line of analysis is much more promising in understanding civil-military conflicts over defense spending in Brazil, where public animosity toward the military regime was relatively low.
Many observers anticipated that the military would be able to extract large budget shares in the new democracy. 44 ........................................ . Thus, my findings demonstrate the superiority of a rational choice approach, which emphasizes human action and its potential for change, over the emphasis by historical institutionalists on the enduring weight of institutional constraints. The power structures and institutional mechanisms established or reaffirmed during a regime transition are not immutable. Rather, they can be successfully challenged and modified by actors pursuing their own goals in the competitive setting of a democracy. In line with a rational choice perspective, Brazilian politicians followed instrumental calculations and contested the armed forces in order to improve their own electoral chances.
While calculations based on self-interest have provided the crucial impulse for pushing back military influence in the new democracy, they have also set limits to these efforts. Politicians are most likely to confront the armed forces when direct gains are at stake. Where military powers and prerogatives do not obstruct the electoral chances of politicians, they tend to remain intact.
For this reason, the Brazilian armed forces have managed to retain considerable autonomy over their narrow corporate affairs. They continue to dominate decisions about defense organization, doctrine, education and training, recruitment, and advancement. Civilian politicians would not gain electorally by trying to reduce the armed forces' command over such internal matters. Most voters have much more pressing concerns, on which politicians rationally focus their attention and energy. The autonomy the armed forces retain over their own corporate affairs is limited only by shrinking budget shares.
Also, Brazilian politicians have not yet subjected the armed forces to institutionalized civilian control, an undertaking that would go well beyond contesting their influence over specific issues. While all politicians have a long-term interest in keeping the military at bay, individuals (especially legislators) are often reluctant to expend the political capital necessary to institute and sustain systematic civilian control. Also, democracy does not induce all politicians to contest the military all of the time. Presidents, who are held accountable for the general well-being of the country, face cross-cutting incentives and pressures. Presidents seek autonomy from the armed forces in order to pursue their own programs, but they also have a strong incentive to avoid provoking the military. Presidents who have lacked the political support to combat Brazil's economic and political crises have been tempted to guarantee governability by allowing military influence to expand. Given his weak civilian support base and lack of direct electoral legitimation, President Sarney often gave in to this temptation. Since Brazil's system of fluid political parties made it exceedingly difficult for him to gain solid backing and to govern effectively, he invoked help from the military. President Franco, who also ascended to office from the vice-presidency and thus suffered from the same liabilities as Sarney, has followed a similar path. Such politically weak presidents can temporarily stall or reverse the general trend toward a reduction of military influence. Yet the operation of counterincentives to contest the armed forces limits these reversals.
Only if a fundamental challenge to the established sociopolitical order emerges-as Brazil's elites feared in the early 1960s-would many politicians be tempted to sacrifice their electoral interests in order to preserve their more fundamental stake in sociopolitical stability. In such an emergency situation, politicians tend to knock on the doors of the barracks and seek protection from the armed forces. The demise of the radical left, however, makes it unlikely that such an extreme situation will recur in Brazil.
Notwithstanding such improbable dangers, the dynamic, expansive view of democracy advanced here justifies a more hopeful outlook on Latin America's fledgling civilian regimes. What has occurred in Brazil suggests that Latin America's new democracies need not be condemned by initial constraints. The opportunism of politicians can enhance the principles of democracy by extending the sovereignty of citizens and undermining the tutelage of soldiers. As Mandeville claimed, private vice may indeed result in public benefit.
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